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THE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY LIMITATION ON





"The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States,"
wrote Chief Justice John Marshall, "is perhaps unlike that of any other
two people in existence."' The presence of more than two hundred
sovereign governments within the territory of another, more powerful
sovereign is indeed an anomaly. The cutting edge of the problem, how-
ever, is blunted by the fact that the Indian tribes have not retained their
full aboriginal sovereignty.' Once separate nations, the tribes were
forced by conquest and treaties to give up complete independence in
return for the aid and protection of the United States? As the Supreme
Court recently noted:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Con-
gress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Con-
gress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In
sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a neces-
sary result of their dependent status.4
* Law clerk to the Honorable Gerald Brown, Presiding Justice, California Court of
Appeal, Fourth District. B.Sc., 1974, University of Alberta; J.D. 1981, University of San
Diego School of Law; member, California Bar. The author is grateful to Darrell Bratton for
his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
2. "While they are sovereign for some purposes, it is now clear that Indian reservations
do not partake of the full territorial sovereignty of States or foreign countries." Washington
v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 165 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
3. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1959). For a brief history, see Clinton, Iso-
lated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-
Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 986-88 (1981).
4. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). Compare the definition of tribal
powers given by Felix Cohen in 1941:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign
LOYOLd OFLOSANGELES L4WREVIEW
The concept of sovereignty developed in Europe during the six-
teenth century in response to the emergence of separate European
states.- From its inception, sovereignty has enjoyed a dual character: it
functions as both shield and sword. Sovereignty signifies the power of
a state over its subjects and territory as well as the right of the state to
be free from interference by other states.6 It is this latter defensive as-
pect of sovereignty that prohibits state efforts to encroach upon tribal
concerns. The doctrine of tribal sovereignty is based upon this theoret-
ical construct. .Assertions of state jurisdiction which unjustifiably in-
fringe upon tribal sovereignty will not survive judicial scrutiny.
Openly anti-assimilationist, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty em-
phasizes the cultural and social distinctiveness of the Indian tribes. It
promotes nationalism and political growth. Perhaps most important,
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty invites the federal judiciary to take an
active part in fundamental policy formulation. In essence, the Supreme
Court should act as a kind of "umpire, protecting Indian or state inter-
ests against extreme abuses by the other."7 This article examines in
depth the doctrine of tribal sovereignty as applied to one narrow, but
important, aspect of state jurisdiction - taxation.
state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United
States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe,
e.g., its powers to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself
affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, le., its powers of local self-government.
(3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation
of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sover-
eignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
government.
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1941) (footnotes omitted). The con-
cept of implied divestiture of tribal powers enunciated in Wheeler is thus a recent judicial
invention. 435 U.S. at 326. According to the Wheeler Court, the tribes have been implicitly
divested of several powers: (1) the power to alienate freely tribal land to non-Indians,
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1974); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); (2) the power to trade or make treaties with
foreign nations, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); and (3) the power to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 208 (1978). See 435 U.S. at 326.
5. See W. BISHOP, JR., BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (3d ed. 1971);
Werhan, The Sovereignty of Indian Tribes: A Reaffrmation and Strengthening in the 1970's,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 6 (1978).
6. This conceptual duality was recognized as early as 1577. See I. DELUPIS, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 3 (1974); see also Comment, Tribal Sovereignty
and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 Term, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 912.
7. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535, 536 (1975).
8. It is important to keep in mind that this article deals only with Indian immunity
from state taxation. Federal taxation of reservation Indians presents entirely different con-
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II. A TERRITORIAL FOUNDATION
Early conceptions of tribal sovereignty reflected the doctrinal ri-
gidity of nineteenth century jurisprudence. Chief Justice Marshall ar-
ticulated a strict, territorial foundation for the doctrine in Worcester v.
Georgia. The notion was that state laws could not operate within res-
ervation boundaries. The Chief Justice wrote:
The Cherokee nation. . . is a distinct community, occu-
pying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the
assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress.' 0
Worcester was a criminal case, but the Court soon made clear that
the territorial principle upon which the decision rested extended to at-
tempts by the states to exercise civil legislative jurisdiction as well.
Thus, shortly after Worcester, in Kansas Indians, I" the Supreme Court
held that a state could not impose its real property taxes upon reserva-
tion lands. Subsequent cases established the general rule that Indians
and Indian property (both real and personal) on Indian reservations
were exempt from state taxation absent congressional authorization.
The converse was also true. Absent congressional conferral of an ex-
emption, Indians and Indian property not on Indian reservations were
subject to state taxation.'
2
These principles remain operative today. For example, in Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,3 the Supreme Court held that a
state could not tax reservation Indians on income derived solely from
reservation sources. And in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes 4 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes,'I the Court held that a
state could not tax an Indian's personal property located on a reserva-
tion. 16 In contrast, in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 7 the Court
siderations. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d
646, 647 (9th Cir. 1977); M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 254-55 (1973).
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
10. Id at 561.
11. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); see New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
12. F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 254.
13. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
14. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
15. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
16. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 375-77 (1976); Valandra v. Veddt, 259
N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (S.D. 1977); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallum County, 78 Wash. 2d 677,
440 P.2d 442 (1968).
17. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
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held that a state's gross receipts tax could lawfully be imposed on a
tribal business operated off the reservation. 8 In short, when only Indi-
ans are involved, the sovereignty limitation on state taxing power can
safely be defined in terms of strict territorialist principles. 19
Once non-Indians enter the picture, however, Marshall's broad ab-
straction fails. It is no longer true (if indeed it ever was) that state laws
can have no force or effect on Indian reservations.20 And if non-Indi-
ans are involved, the locus of a transaction or the situs of a piece of
property does not ipso facto determine its taxability. In Moe, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court held that a state could lawfully apply its ciga-
rette sales and excise taxes to sales by tribal retailers to non-Indians
even though the sales took place on an Indian reservation.2'
The Court's decision not to adhere to pure territorialist principles
in the tax cases involving non-Indians has been the subject of some
criticism.22 The territorialists argue that territoriality provides a sure,
simple, and predictable ground for allocating jurisdiction to tax.23
Actually, it does no such thing. Aside from the difficulty of locat-
ing multistage transactions which occur partially on and partially off a
reservation, and aside from the problems involved in determining the
tax situs of property used or kept both on and off a reservation, reserva-
18. The Court in Mescalero stated that:
Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law other-
wise applicable to all citizens of the State. . . . That principle is as relevant to a
State's tax laws as it is to state criminal laws. . . and applies as much to tribal ski
resorts as it does to fishing enterprises.
Id at 148-49 (citations omitted).
19. For a recent case, see Estate of Johnson, 125 Cal. App. 3d 1044, 178 Cal. Rptr. 823
(1981), holding that California could not apply its inheritance tax to the intestate transfer of
reservation realty, pension benefits, and life insurance benefits owned by a reservation In-
dian and acquired by him during lifetime employment on the reservation.
20. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946) (states may try non-
Indians who commit crimes against each other on Indian reservations).
21. 425 U.S. at 483; accord Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
As long ago as 1898 the Supreme Court recognized that a rigid territorialist approach was
inappropriate in cases involving state taxation of non-Indians. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S,
264 (1898) (states may tax a non-Indian's cattle grazing on reservation lands leased from an
Indian tribe).
22. See Barsh, The Omen. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Future of Tribal Se/-
Government, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 53-56 (1977); Craig, The Indian Tax Cases-A Terri-
torial.Ana/ys4, 9 N.M.L. REV. 221, 262 (1979).
23. According to Professor Barsh: "Territory is a superior rule for resolving conflicts
among political subdivisions because it is relatively clear, precise, and objectively ascertain-
able. It is not subject to judicial construction. Problems arise when legislatures choose as
taxable incidents events incapable of accurate location in time or space." Barsh, supra note
22, at 56.
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tion boundaries themselves are often uncertain. A great many reserva-
tions have been at least partially dismantled and litigation over
reservation boundaries is rampant.24 In addition, bothersome patterns
of "checkerboard jurisdiction" exist on many reservations.25 Thus,
there is no guarantee that a pure territorialist approach would either
increase certainty or decrease litigation. Moreover, a strict territorialist
model carries with it the fatal flaw of unbending rigidity. Adherence to
unthinking territorialism in cases involving citizens of more than one
sovereign would hinder efforts by the courts to dispose of tax immunity
issues through reference to public policy and the competing govern-
mental interests at stake. This consideration is particularly significant
in the "special area of state taxation,"26 because of the vast panoply of
highly individualized situations in which tax issues arise. The Court
has done well to retreat from Chief Justice Marshall's early view.
III. THE SHIFT To AN INFRINGEMENT STANDARD
The Supreme Court's retreat from the Marshallian view did not
signal rejection of the sovereignty principle itself. Rather, it repre-
sented a shift from doctrine to realism. The notion seemed to be that
tribal sovereignty would bar state jurisdiction only when it made sense
for it to do so. That it makes sense for it to do so in cases involving the
on-reservation conduct or property of reservation Indians is clear: the
confluence of tribal power over Indians and tribal power over reserva-
tion territory in such cases strongly implicates the tribe's sovereign in-
terest in freedom from interference. On the other hand, when non-
Indians are involved, the impact of state taxes on tribal sovereignty is
less obvious and the line between permissible and impermissible intru-
sions tends to blur. The problem is that once non-Indians enter the
24. See, e.g., United States v. Dupris, 612 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 980
(1980). Reservation boundary disputes can be incredibly complex; troublesome questions of
congressional intent, statutory construction, and statutory compliance are almost invariably
involved and the cases tend to present difficult problems of proof, aside from the questions
of law. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The issues in reservation
disestablishment cases are no less intricate. For an illustrative case see Stankey v. Waddell,
256 N.W.2d 117 (N.D. 1977). The problems in this area are further complicated by the fact
that not only reservation lands are tax-exempt. Certain allotted lands enjoy a similar status.
Compare South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870 (D. Alaska 1979) with
County of Thurston: v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952
(1979). For a collection of cases and commentary on the question see id at 1219-20.
25. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). But cf. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980).
26. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
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picture, important state policies are implicated. The Supreme Court's
response has been to establish a simple predicate to the invalidation of
state taxation of non-Indians under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty:
the challenged tax must work some actual and substantial interference
with the tribal political infrastructure before it will be invalidated.
The seminal case dealing with this issue was Williams v. Lee,27 in
which the Court held that Arizona courts did not have jurisdiction over
a suit by a non-Indian against a reservation Indian to recover a debt
which arose on the reservation. The Court declared that allowing the
state to exercise jurisdiction "would undermine the authority of the tri-
bal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves."2 The Court formulated
what has become known as the Williams test for determining whether
principles of tribal sovereignty will oust state jurisdiction in cases in-
volving non-Indians: "[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the ques-
tion [is] whether the state action infringe[s] on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."2 9
Williams was decided in 1959. Since then, the Supreme Court has
not used the infringement test to strike down a state tax on persons
dealing with reservation Indians. The Court has acknowledged the test
in dictum30 and has applied the standard twice,3' but it has yet to find a
violation.
As might be expected, the Court has not relied on the Williams test
in cases involving only reservation Indians. The Court has invalidated
a number of state taxes imposed on reservation Indians, 3 2 but the Wil-
liams standard has never provided the ratio decidendi. Instead, the
cases continue to be governed by territorialist principles. Indeed, in Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,33 in which it was held that a
state could not tax the reservation income of a reservation Indian, the
27. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
28. Id at 223.
29. Id at 220. The Williams Court did not explicitly confine its new test to cases involv-
ing only non-Indians, but the Court has since made it clear that the test is so restricted. See
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973).
30. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1980).
31. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state motor vehi-
cle, mobile home, camper and travel trailer taxes); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373
(1976) (county mobile home tax); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463 (1976) (state personal property taxes); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164 (1973) (state income tax).
33. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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Court was careful to point out that not only. was the infringement test
not being used, it was inapplicable. Justice Marshall wrote for a unani-
mous Court: "We reject the suggestion that the Williams test was
meant to apply in this situation. It must be remembered that cases ap-
plying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations involving
non-Indians. ,,
34
Nonetheless, even in those cases in which the Court has struck
down state taxes imposed on non-Indians, it has not embraced the Wil-
liams infringement standard. For instance, in Warren Trading Post Co.
v. Arizona Tax Commission,3" the Court held that Arizona could not
tax a federally licensed Indian trader's income derived from trading
with reservation Indians on the reservation. The Warren Trading Post
decision, however, rested on federal preemption grounds and the Wil-
liams test was ignored. In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Com-
mission,36 the Court held that Arizona could not impose its transaction
privilege tax on an on-reservation sale of farm machinery by an Ari-
zona corporation to an Indian tribe. Again, the ground for decision
was federal preemption and Williams was ignored. And in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,37 the Court held that Arizona's mo-
tor carrier license tax and use fuel taxes could not be imposed upon a
non-Indian corporation which performed logging operations for an In-
dian tribe on the Indian reservation. The Court acknowledged the Wil-
liams test,3" but did not reach the question whether Arizona's taxes
infringed on tribal self-government. As in CentralMachinery and War-
ren Trading Post, the Court found instead that the state taxes were pre-
empted by paramount federal law.39 Only in Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes4' and Washington v. Confederated Tribes41
did the Court actually apply the infringement test, and in both cases the
state taxes in question were upheld.42
Williams has not fared much better in the lower courts, although
one court has invalidated a state tax using a version of the infringement
34. Id at 179 (citing Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962))
(emphasis added); see Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 681 n.2
(Minn. 1980); Barsh, supra note 22, at 16; Craig, supra note 22, at 246.
35. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
36. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
37. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
38. Id at 142.
39. Id at 148-51. The Court found that the case was "in all relevant aspects indistin-
guishable from Warren Trading Post." Id at 153.
40. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
41. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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test.43 In Eastern Navajo Industries, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue,44 the
New Mexico Court of Appeals held that a corporation, fifty-one per-
cent of which was owned by reservation Indians and forty-nine percent
of which was owned by non-Indians, could not be taxed on its gross
receipts from the construction of houses on the Navajo reservation. In
a confusing opinion, seemingly resting partially on territorialist princi-
ples, the court found that imposition of the tax would constitute "'a
severe burden upon and a hindrance to the self-government of the
Navajo tribe.' ,4 The court was heavily influenced by the fact that a
majority of the taxpayer's shares were owned by Indians. 6
The lack of court decisions invalidating state taxes under the Wil-
liams test makes it difficult to map out the contours of the standard in
any positive sense. It is impossible to predict with any assurance the
circumstances under which state taxes will be held to infringe imper-
missibly upon tribal self-government. The decided cases do, however,
lend some insight into when state taxes will not run afoul of Williams.
An outline of the doctrine can thus be sketched, albeit somewhat
roughly, by negative implication.
IV. THE REACH OF THE WILLIAMS TEST
MeClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission47 made clear that the Wil-
liams test was not designed to resolve questions of tribal sovereign im-
munity from state taxation when non-Indians were not involved.4
Instead, such claims, although rationalized in terms of governmental
infringement,49 continue to be governed as a practical matter by territo-
rialist principles. The bare holding of MeClanahan was that the state
of Arizona could not lawfully apply its state income tax to "reservation
Indians with income derived wholly from reservation sources." 50 Left
open was the question whether Indians who resided on the reservation
43. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (using interest balancing
to hold a state mineral severance tax invalid on tribal sovereignty grounds).
44. 89 N.M. 369, 552 P.2d 805 (Ct: App. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
45. Id at 371, 552 P.2d at 807.
46. See id at 372-73, 552 P.2d at 808-09.
47. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
48. See su~pra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Comment, Indian Taxatiorn Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59
CALIF. L. Rav. 1261, 1283-84, 1294-95 (1971) (arguing that personal property and possessory
use taxes, as applied to reservation lands and personalty, which the courts have historically
held invalid on territorialist grounds, also interfere with tribal self-government in violation
of Williams).
50. 411 U.S. at 165.
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but who were not enrolled in the governing tribe were "reservation In-
dians" and thus exempt from the tax.
This issue was decided by the Supreme Court of Montana in La
Roque v. Montana. 11 After reviewing the relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions, the Montana court concluded that territorial-
ist principles governed questions of Indian exemption from state taxa-
tion, regardless of tribal affiliation. The "situs of the activity," said the
court, "is the primary factor in determining whether state taxation ju-
risdiction exists, not the status of the individual as enrolled or non-
enrolled." 2 The court held that the McClanahan exemption extended
to all Indians residing on the reservation, whether or not enrolled in the
governing tribe. Similarly, in Fox v. Bureau of Revenue 3 the Court of
Appeals of New Mexico held that a Comanche Indian who worked and
resided on the Navajo reservation in New Mexico was exempt from
New Mexico's income tax, even though she was not enrolled as a mem-
ber of the Navajo tribe. And in Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue54
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that an enrolled member of
Washington's Tulalip tribe who lived and worked on the Red Lake
Indian reservation in Minnesota was exempt from Minnesota's income
tax. In sum, those state courts that have considered the question are in
unanimous agreement: "Without exception, it [has been] held that tri-
bal affiliation is of no moment when determining the taxability by
states of an Indian on a reservation."
5
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court ruled to the
contrary. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes56 the Court held that
Washington's sales and cigarette taxes could be applied to on-reserva-
tion sales of cigarettes to Indians residing on the reservation but not
enrolled in the governing tribe. The Court held that the territorialist
principle, which automatically bars state taxation of sales to tribal
members, did not apply to those Indians not a part of the formal polit-
ical unit; they were governed by the Williams infringement test, which
the Court found was not violated.
The Supreme Court's holding seems reasonably in line with its de-
cisions under the equal protection clause. The Court has repeatedly
51. 178 Mont. 315, 583 P.2d 1059 (1978).
52. Id at 324, 583 P.2d at 1064.
53. 87 N.M. 261, 531 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1975).
54. 291 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1980).
55. Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 261, 263, 531 P.2d 1234, 1236, cert. denied, 424
U.S. 933 (1975).
56. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
57. Id at 160-61.
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emphasized the political as opposed to racial character of the Indian
tribes in upholding, against equal protection challenges, congressional
enactments favoring Indians.58 Indeed, a ruling by the Court that race,
rather than tribal membership, was determinative of an Indian's tax
liability would have raised serious equal protection questions. Never-
theless, in one respect the Confederated Tribes Court may have gone
too far. The case does not distinguish between Indians who are en-
rolled in a tribe other than the governing tribe and Indians who are not
members of any tribe at all. The Court's holding would seem to en-
compass the former as well as the latter.59 Yet thepolitical character of
any exemption is assured as long as it is restricted to Indians enrolled in
some federally recognized tribe. There would appear to be no reason
why such an Indian should lose his traditional on-reservation tax im-
munity merely because he temporarily resides or works on a reserva-
tion governed by a tribe not his own. The state acquires no legitimate
interest in taxing him simply by virtue of his presence on reservation A
instead of reservation B; both reservations are protected areas within
which state authority is narrowly circumscribed. Nor would his reloca-
tion necessarily have occasioned any extension to him of state benefits
which might justify taxation on a quid pro quo theory. In short, a
member of a federally recognized tribe should retain his state tax im-
munity when he moves from one reservation to another. Moreover,
Indians should be able to move freely between reservations without
sacrificing important federally protected rights. A contrary rule would
unnecessarily impede intertribal commerce and possibly retard reserva-
tion development.
Significantly, federal statutes and regulations granting preferential
treatment to Indians by virtue of their special status do not generally
distinguish between Indians belonging to different tribes; "Indian" is
defined as someone of Indian descent who is a member of "a" or "any"
federally recognized tribe.Y0 The holding of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue6 - that principles of ter-
ritorial sovereignty bar state taxation of Indians enrolled in a tribe
58. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
59. The Court spoke only of "Indians resident on the reservation but not enrolled in the
governing Tribe." 447 U.S. at 160. No mention was made of the possible significance of any
other tribal affiliations.
60. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 450(b), 479 (1976); 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.2(c), 20.1(p) (1981); 42
C.F.R. § 36.12(a) (1981). Of course, the fact that the federal government may choose to
ignore tribal differences does not, of itself, mean ihat the states must also.
61. 291 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 1980).
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other than the tribe governing the reservation - thus appears to be
more nearly consistent with congressional recognition of the Indians'
sovereign status than the Supreme Court's sweeping generalization in
Confederated Tribes. The less protective Williams infringement test
should be reserved for cases involving either non-Indians or persons of
Indian ancestry who lack any formal tribal affiliation.6 2
V. DEFINING INFRINGEMENT: A LOOK AT WHAT IT IS NOT -
AND A GLIMPSE OF WHAT IT MAY BE
Throughout a course of adjudication spanning nearly 100 years,
the Indian tribes have persistently argued that the potential economic
burden imposed on a tribe by state taxation of non-Indians doing busi-
ness with the tribe impermissibly infringes upon tribal self-government.
This contention has been just as persistently rejected by the courts.
63
The issue has arisen under various circumstances, but the result in
each case has been the same. In the early case of Thomas v. Gay 64 the
Supreme Court held that a state could tax cattle grazing on lands leased
62. See Clinton, supra note 3, at 1015-16 (footnotes omitted):
The Court's focus on political membership of tribal Indians has had another awk-
ward consequence - the fragmentation of governance on Indian reservations. In-
dian communities often include many individuals, sometimes full-blooded Indians,
who through marriage or as a result of having parents of different tribal back-
grounds, are ineligible for formal enrollment as members of the tribe on whose
reservation they reside. Yet, Indians and non-Indians alike usually consider such
persons to be socially, economically, and culturally part of the Indian community.
The Court's blind and rigid focus on tribal affiliation is beginning to oust Indian
tribes from power to govern these nonmember reservation Indians and to enlarge
the sphere of state authority over these Indian residents who are not members of
the governing tribe, even if they are enrolled members of a different tribe. This
recent development is inconsistent with prior law and is profoundly disturbing to
the integrity of the reservation Indian community.
See also id at 1016 n.225:
The irony of the line-drawing caused by the Court's rigid focus on political mem-
bership is evident from a close examination of the results of Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). After
[Confederated Tribes], a member of the Colville tribes who lives in Seattle and
returns to the reservation infrequently for social and ceremonial occasions is ex-
empt from state taxation and exclusively subject to tribal governance while on the
reservation. By contrast, a full-blood member of the Yakima nation who is mar-
ried to and lives with a member of the Colville tribe is subject to state taxation
despite his long-term residence on an Indian reservation and his membership in a
federally recognized Indian tribe. Given Indian marriage and residential patterns,
full implementation of [Confederated Tribes] could decimate tribal government of
the Indian community living on the reservation.
63. But see Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (Indian
tribe's complaint, which alleged that state's mineral severance tax on non-Indian company
mining reservation coal would have a substantial adverse economic effect on the tribe, stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted) (alternative holding).
64. 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
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by a non-Indian from an Indian tribe. The Court rejected the tribe's
argument that tribal sovereignty barred the tax because the rent the
tribe could command for the land would be reduced without a tax ex-
emption.65 Similarly, in Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernar-
dino,66 the Ninth Circuit held that a county possessory interest tax
could validly be imposed on non-Indian lessees of tribal lands even
though the net effect of the tax would be to reduce the revenue the tribe
could receive from the leases. "Such an indirect economic burden,"
said the court, "cannot be said to threaten the self-governing ability of
the tribe.I67 And in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey," the Tenth
Circuit went one step further. The court upheld New Mexico's gross
receipts tax on the income received by non-Indian contractors for work
performed for an Indian tribe on a reservation, even though the tribe
had contracted to pay any tax that might be imposed on the contrac-
tors.69 The court found no interference with tribal self-government.7
The holding of the Mescalero case may, at first glance, appear star-
tling. It is clearly at odds with the principles of territorial sovereignty
that apply to cases involving only Indians.71 The tax would have been
invalid if imposed directly upon the tribe.72 If the tribe had done the
65. Id at 273.
66. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
67. Id at 1258; accord Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,
442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972); see Powers, Taxation.- State
Possessory Interest Tax, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 231 (1978).
68. 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
69. The court found that the legal incidence of the tax remained on the contractors,
notwithstanding the agreement by the tribe to absorb the cost. The court emphasized that:
[The way [this tax] was handled by the tribe makes it appear that the incidence of
the tax was on the Tribe when it was not. . . .The asserted direct "burden" on
the Tribe was thus by its own election to indemnify the contractors. The result in
this case should not be determined or influenced in any way by such a contractual
arrangement.
Id at 969 (emphasis in original).
70. The court noted that:
The indirect burden [of the tax] is ...something to be again passed on as the
Tribe engages in its resort and other business. It is the indirect consequence of
taxes on others which reaches the Mescaleros as do all other costs, levies and taxes
on persons with whom they do business. If this is an interference, all such taxes
and levies on those doing business with them, the suppliers of such persons, the
wholesalers and the manufacturers are likewise an interference. All these taxes
affect the money of the Mescaleros the same way, and the money available for
other purposes.
Id at 972 (emphasis in original). See G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 89 N.M. 265,
550 P.2d 277 (1976).
71. After Confederated Tribes, the Mescalero holding may merely conflict with territo-
rial sovereignty principles applicable to cases involving only members of the governing tribe,
See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
72. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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construction work itself the tax could not have been levied. But, be-
cause the tribe had the work done by non-Indians, the court held that
the tax burden could lawfully be imposed upon it. The result is a dis-
tinction between taxes which are imposed directly upon an Indian tribe
and taxes which are imposed directly upon someone else but which
ultimately become the tribe's burden. The first is impermissible; the
second is permissible - an apparent exaltation of form over substance.
This argument misses the mark. Simply put, it presupposes that
principles of territorial sovereignty govern the transaction, when clearly
they do not. Whenever a tax is imposed upon a non-Indian, the theme
of territorial dominance is inapposite because the state, as well as the
tribe, has an interest in asserting jurisdiction. The tribal sovereignty
doctrine seeks an accommodation between these competing interests
"by providing that the State [can] protect its interest up to the point
where tribal self-government would be affected." 3 Concepts of territo-
riality are disregarded: the guidepost is Williams v. Lee.
The gross receipts tax in Mescalero was a cost of doing business
like any other. Like the wages paid by the contractor to his workers,
the sales tax paid on his equipment, and the rising costs of the raw
materials used on the job, the gross receipts tax is something the con-
tractor passes on to the recipients of his services. Costs such as these
are borne by the consumers of every imaginable product or service;
they filter endlessly through society. The federal government suffers
the impact of the state income taxes exacted from those who perform
work for it. The sovereignty of the state governments does not entitle
their employees to an exemption from federal income taxes, while the
nation's county and municipal governments absorb the impact of all
kinds of taxes daily. The economic burden imposed on the Mescaleros
did not constitute interference with their self-government; it merely
represented the cost of a ticket into the marketplace. The price of ad-
mission is the same for governments as it is for anyone else. The Tenth
Circuit's holding was sound.
Thomas involved a personal property tax, Fort Mojave a posses-
sory interest tax, and Mescalero a gross receipts tax. All three cases
held that the economic burden on an Indian tribe resulting from the
imposition of the particular tax in question on a non-Indian did not
constitute an impermissible infringement on tribal self-government.7 4
73. Id at 179.
74. See Tiffany Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 96 N.M. 296, 629 P.2d 1225, 1229-30
(1981) (state's gross receipts tax upheld as applied to non-Indian contractor who graded and
drained road on Indian reservation, even though indirect burden of tax was on Indian tribe);
1982)
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A variation on this theme was provided in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes," in which the Supreme Court held that the application of
Washington's sales and excise taxes to on-reservation sales of cigarettes
by tribal retailers to non-members of the tribes did not contravene the
Williams principle.
The tribes had established retail smokeshops on their reservations.
The smokeshop operators refused to collect state taxes on their ciga-
rette sales to non-Indians. This allowed the tribal smokeshops to un-
dercut their competitors by more than one dollar per carton of
cigarettes.76 As a result, the great majority of the smokeshops' sales
were to residents of nearby communities who traveled to the reserya-
tions solely to take advantage of the claimed exemption. 77 It was con-
ceded that without a tax exemption the tribes' retail sales to outsiders
would cease,78 and the tribes argued forcefully that the resultant eco-
nomic impact on their governmental programs would be devastating.
79
The smokeshop revenues were expended by the tribes for "essential
governmental services, including programs to combat severe poverty
and underdevelopment at the reservations."' 0 Nevertheless, the Court,
applying Williams, found that tribal sovereignty did not bar the tax.
The Court noted that "Washington does not infringe the right of reser-
vation Indians to 'make their own laws and be ruled by them' . . .
merely because the result of imposing its taxes will be to deprive the
Tribes of revenues which they currently are receiving."'
s
The Court's approach is consistent with both sovereignty theory
and conventional tax analysis. Taxes are generally not invalidated
merely because their otherwise lawful imposition sets off a chain of
events that produces an economic burden on someone who is exempt
from tax.8 2 This principle has been widely followed; it applies to state
Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 95 N.M. 708, 625 P.2d 1225, 1228-
29 (N.M. App. 1980) (state's gross receipts tax upheld as applied to non-Indian contractor
who built school on Indian reservation even though indirect burden of tax was on Indian
School Board).
75. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
76. Id at 145.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id at 154.
80. Id
81. Id at 156 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220).
82. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 159 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting): "As a general rule, a tax is not invalid simply because a nonexempt taxpayer
may be expected to pass all or part of the cost of the tax through to a person who is exempt
from tax." .d; see also United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958).
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and federal governments, as well as to private individuals.83 There is
no reason why it should not apply with equal force to the Indian
tribes.
84
If the economic impact of a state tax, standing alone, will not cause
the tax to fail under Williams, what will? The answer may lie in Wil-
liams itself. Williams spoke of "the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."8 Thus, a state tax which directly
inhibited passage or enforcement of some tribal law might possibly vio-
late Williams.
The most obvious area of potential conflict is with tribal taxing
ordinances. Indian tribes enjoy unfettered power to tax non-Indians
engaging in economic activity on their reservations.86 Moreover, "[t]he
power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly in-
volving a tribe or its members is afundamental attribute of sovereignty
.... ,87 A tribe's ability to exercise its sovereign taxing power may
clearly be impaired if a state taxes the same object or activity.8 8 State
taxation of enterprises on the reservation puts the Indian tribe in a diffi-
cult position: the tribe can choose to impose its own tax and thereby
place the on-reservation enterprise at a competitive disadvantage rela-
83. See 447 U.S. 134, 185-86 n.9 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part): "[T]he State, through its exercise of taxing authority, can effectively require the Fed-
eral Government to forgo revenues which would otherwise be available to it in order to
remain competitive as an enterprise." Id at 186 n.9. The best example is probably United
States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977), in which the Supreme Court upheld Cali-
fornia's possessory use tax on federal employees living in federal housing in the state over
the federal government's argument that it would have to absorb the cost itself to remain
competitive as a landlord and employer. Id at 457.
84. But see 447 U.S. at 171-72.n.7 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (suggesting that the relative competitive inequality between state and tribal govern-
ments justifies enhanced judicial protection of tribal enterprises from state taxation). Contra
id at 186 n.ll (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. 358 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
86. 447 U.S. at 152; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 393 (1904); Iron Crow v. Oglala
Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1956); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir.
1905). See generally Comment, The Casefor Exclusive Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees
of Indian Lands, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 491, 503-07 (1975).
87. 447 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
88. As one commentator has stated:
The question that must be asked is: Does a reduction of revenue affect the
self-governing ability? An answer by analogy could be if the Treasury Department
of the United States suddenly had competition in collection of taxation revenue
from another government agency, would that affect Treasury's purpose as the pri-
mary collection department for the nation's funds? Yes, of course it would. Al-
though the Treasury Department would still be able to function, it would not have
the sole responsibility, and therefore its ability and purpose would be thwarted or
reduced. Tribes would be put in much the same position.
Powers, supra note 67, at 233.
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tive to off-reservation businesses, 9 or it can choose not to impose its tax
and thereby forgo much needed revenues.90 It is difficult to imagine a
clearer case of state interference with tribal self-government. 9 l
This argument was considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Fort Mojave v. County of San Bernardino 92 At
issue in Fort Mojave was a county possessory interest tax on non-In-
dian lessees of tribal lands. The tribe had its own possessory interest
tax and argued that the state's tax violated the Williams test.93 The
court disagreed. The court's rationale that "[tihere is no improper
double taxation here at all. . . for the taxes are being imposed by two
different and distinct taxing authorities" 94 seems unconvincing. Al-
though the taxes were being imposed by two different and distinct tax-
ing authorities, it was precisely this concurrent taxing jurisdiction that
was being challenged. The Ninth Circuit seemed to have completely
missed the point. Understandably, Fort Mojave has been criticized.
The opinion has never been disapproved, however.
9 6
89. This competitive disadvantage could be fatal to reservation development because
reservation businesses are already disadvantaged by reason of their location. See 447 U.S.
at 169-70 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Barsh, supra note 22, at
43-47.
90. Tribal tax bases are small, the income of reservation Indians being only one-fourth
the national average. If tribal governments are to survive, they must have tax revenues, and
on-reservation enterprises involving non-Indians may be their only realistic source of tax
income. See DiPasquale, NaturalResources Taxation, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 281,283-84 (1980).
91. See 447 U.S. at 169-71 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., dis-
senting); Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Soveregnty and Economic Development,
49 N.D.L. REv. 267, 281-82 (1973); Note, Balancing the Interests in Taxation ofNon-Indian
Activities on Indian Lands, 64 IowA L. REv. 1459, 1501-03 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Taxation ofNon-Indian Activities]. Significantly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
threat that multiple layers of taxation present to Indian self-government. In Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), speaking to the question of general civil regulatory control
over reservation Indians by state governments, the Court stated:
[S]ince tribal governments are disabled under many state laws from incorporating
as local units of government,. . . general regulatory control might relegate tribal
governments to a level below that of counties and municipalities, thus, essentially
destroying them, particularly if they might raise revenue only after the tax base
had been filtered through many governmental layers of taxation.
Id at 388-89 n.14.
92. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
93. Id at 1257-58.
94. Id
95. See Note, Taxation of Non-Indian Activities, sura note 91, at 1501 n.265.
96. The continued vitality of the FortMojave decision is, nevertheless, now questionable
in light of dictum in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), in which the Supreme
Court expressed concern that multiple state and tribal taxation could essentially destroy
tribal governments by severely diminishing their tax bases. Id. at 388-89 n.14. See Crow
Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (state severance tax which sub-
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In Washington v. Confederated Tribes the Supreme Court faced the
double taxation issue. The case, however, is unsatisfactory authority
for several reasons. The Court upheld the application of Washington's
cigarette and sales taxes to on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-
members of the confederated tribes even though the tribes also taxed
the transactions. 97 The Court was strongly influenced by a notion that
what the tribes were seeking to do - market an exemption from state
taxation to outsiders - was not a legitimate business venture. 98 The
result might have been different had the case involved something other
than purely parasitic activity on the part of the tribes. Equally impor-
tant in defining the reach of the decision is the fact that only sales taxes
- pure revenue raising devices - were at issue. The case says nothing
about the preclusive effect of tribal land taxes or activity taxes - taxes
which implicate stronger governmental interests. Indeed, the Court
was careful to point out that the tribe's sales taxes served no distribu-
tive or regulatory functions, an observation which suggests that if the
taxes had been designed to do something other than raise revenue from
a tainted business activity the Court might have ruled the other way.99
stantially affects a tribe's ability to provide governmental services or to regulate the develop-
ment of tribal resources by impairing the tribe's ability to levy its own severance tax held
invalid). In Crow Tribe, the Ninth Circuit reached a result apparently at odds with its Fort
Mojave decision by employing an interest balancing approach. The court made no effort to
distinguish its earlier decision and it is doubtful whether a meaningful distinction can in fact
be drawn - at least from a governmental interest perspective.
97. 447 U.S. at 154-59.
98. The Court stated:
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons
coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the
Tribes have a significant interest. . . . What the smokeshops offer these custom-
ers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state taxation.
The Tribes assert the power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes
or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises. If this
assertion were accepted, the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open chains of
discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep dis-
counts and drawing custom[ers] from surrounding areas. We do not believe that
principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-
government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption
from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.
Id at 155.
99. The Court stated: "Although taxes can be used for distributive or regulatory pur-
poses, as well as for raising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to the tribal taxes at
issue in these cases. . . . Hence, we perceive no conflict between state and tribal law war-
ranting invalidation of the State's taxes." Id at 158-59. Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New
Mexico, 630 F.2d 724,730 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981) (drawing a distinc-
tion between tribal ordinances of a purely revenue-raising nature and those which have a
regulatory purpose). The court noted that "dual systems of pure taxation are not inherently
conflicting. In contrast, dual regulatory schemes... necessarily create mutual dislocations."
Id (emphasis in case).
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Confederated Tribes thus raises as many questions as it resolves.
The problem of state infringement on tribal self-government through
dual taxation remains. Perhaps the best solution, not adopted in Con-
federated Tribes, would be to allow both sovereigns to tax the sales but
demand that the state credit against its tax the amount of any tribal
taxes that were paid.°0 This would adequately protect the state's fiscal
interests, because as long as the state taxed the sales, non-Indians
would be unable to exploit the exemption enjoyed by reservation Indi-
ans and would locate their purchases independently of tax considera-
tions. Concomitantly, because a credit would eliminate the threat of a
double tax burden, the tribes would be able to levy their taxes without
placing their on-reservation businesses at a competitive disadvantage
relative to off-reservation establishments. A tax credit scheme would
thus leave the tribes free to structure their taxing schemes in conformity
with their own views of sound policy while assuring the states that they
would not be victimized by the presence of "tax havens" within their
borders. Significantly, seven members of the Supreme Court have indi-
cated that they see some merit in a tax credit mechanism,' 1' and the
concept may yet be adopted by the states.
The Court's cryptic reference in Confederated Tribes to the distrib-
utive and regulatory functions of taxation raises an interesting issue.
Taxation can be a powerful, sophisticated tool for manipulating do-
mestic economic activity. It can be used to encourage desirable activi-
ties and discourage undesirable ones.102 Thus, a decision by a tribe not
to tax a particular activity might be just as strongly grounded in a tribal
fiscal and social policy as a decision to tax. For example, a tribe might
offer tax incentives to industry to induce it to locate on the reservation.
State taxation of the industry could, therefore, as a natural disincentive,
interfere with tribal self-government to the same extent as state taxa-
tion of some activity the tribe had chosen to tax.' 3 Williams, after all,
100. This approach was considered by the Confederated Tribes Court in connection with
its discussion of the tribes' claims that the dual taxation in that case violated the negative
implications of the commerce clause as it applies to Indians, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Court declined to apply the remedy because it found insufficient evidence in the record
to support a finding that Indian commerce would be significantly reduced by a state tax
without a tax credit as opposed to a state tax with a credit. 447 U.S. at 157.
101. See id at 157, 172, 175. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor are the only members of
the Court who have not expressed an opinion on the matter.
102. See Barsh, supra note 22, at 43-47; Israel & Smithson, supra note 91, at 281-82.
103. Assuming, that is, that state taxation of the latter would interfere with tribal self-
government. Compare Fort Mojave v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977) with Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388-89
n.14 (1976); see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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spoke of the "right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them."'" The right (or, more precisely, the power) to make
laws necessarily includes the right to refrain from making them. Inter-
ference with the latter would seem to be just as pernicious as interfer-
ence with the former. State taxation should thus be disallowed under
Williams whenever it interferes unreasonably with internal tribal fiscal
and social policy, regardless of whether it is positively expressed in the
form of a tribal taxing ordinance.
10 5
Of course, the more sympathetic facts would be those in which the
tribe had enacted a comprehensive scheme of tax credits, exemptions,
and subsidies analogous to the highly developed Navajo court system
which was held in Williams to bar state court jurisdiction over on-reser-
vation transactions between Indians and non-Indians. 06 The tribe's
fiscal policies would then be clear and state interference could be easily
inferred. 0 7 But there should be no need for the tribe to tax a particular
activity to prevent the state from taxing it, at least as long as the tribe's
reasons for not taxing the activity are legitimate.1
0 8
This "dormant tribal taxing power" limitation has not yet been
invoked in an actual case, 109 but it may become important in the future
- in the burgeoning area of natural resources development." 0 Many
104. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (emphasis added).
105. See Israel & Smithson, supra note 91, at 282:
The taxing decisions made or left unmade by the governmental entity significantly
affect the culture, economic development, and collective goals of the people. In-
dian tribes must have the ability to make decisions about the quality of life and
economic development upon their reservations unfettered by value judgments
made by state revenue directors or state legislators. Interference with tribal self-
government must be read in the Williams infringement test to comprehend much
more than simply competition between the state and the tribe for a particular dol-
lar of revenue. Concurrent taxing power, vested in a state, can be a powerful
weapon for the advancement of state interest rather than tribal interests. It is for
this reason that state attempts to tax on Indian reservations are arrogant, and po-
tentially genocidal to Indian communities.
106. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
107. Indeed, such a scheme would likely satisfy the "distributive and regulatory pur-
poses" element mentioned by the Supreme Court in Confederated Tribes. See supra note 99
and accompanying text.
108. Cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
109. But see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1980)
(McKay, J., dissenting) ("tribal preemption of state regulatory schemes has clear support").
110. See Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and its Impact on Reservation Re-
source Development, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 617 (1976):
[Tihe continuing insistence of states to impose ever larger tax burdens on reserva-
tion mineral development, coupled with the increased self-assertiveness of Indian
tribes, makes it almost inevitable that a mining venture extracting Indian resources
today will be involved in lengthy and complex tax jurisdiction litigation no matter
what its ownership and management composition. Given the historical animosity
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western Indian reservations contain vast deposits of coal, sulphur, ura-
nium, oil, and natural gas."' The tribes, understandably eager to ex-
ploit these valuable energy sources, have contracted with non-Indian
companies to undertake mineral development which, in turn, prima fa-
cie legitimates state taxation of the projects." 2 It is feasible that a state
would enact a tax for the express purpose of deterring the development
of natural resources within its borders. As applied to reservation re-
sources, such a tax would conflict directly with tribal development poli-
cies, perhaps exemplified by a tribe's express decision not to tax such
resources. Under the dormant tribal taxing power theory, the state tax
arguably would be invalid as an infringement on tribal self-
government.
Even if a state tax credit were mandated, the tribe could not solve
the problem by enacting a tax of its own. The tribe could attempt to
lay claim to a larger portion of the tax revenues, but it could not pre-
vent the state from forcing a cessation of operations because the state
could simply enact a higher prohibitory tax. Moreover, a tax credit
cannot solve the problem of state taxation designed to curb or deter
reservation activity because, even with a credit, the activity would still
be taxed and thereby discouraged. A tax credit mechanism only has
value as a tribal revenue protecting device. The sole solution to the
problem of regulatory or prohibitory state taxation would appear to be
strict invalidation under the Williams infringement test.
VI. MCCLANAHAN V ARIZONA TAX COMMISSION."
THE BACKDROP PRINCIPLE
Despite its theoretical potency, tribal sovereignty has not been fa-
vored by the Supreme Court as a ground for decision in the Indian tax
between the states and the Indian tribes, there seems little likelihood that either or
both of the government entities would accept a compromise solution ....
. .. To the extent tribes are able to assert their proprietary power to convert
tribal resources into risk capital instead of merely royalty, and to the extent tribes
are able to assert their governmental power to preempt state taxation of resource
development, they will be in a position to maximize the economic returns from
reservation resource development through a balancing of capital investment and
tribal taxation. Once tribal powers are fully realized and the issues of tribal pre-
emption are finally resolved, Indian resource ventures will have many of the char-
acteristics of developing nation concession arrangements formulated by resource-
owning foreign governments who lack the expertise and capital necessary to de-
velop their resources alone.
Id at 650-51 (footnotes omitted).
111. See DiPasquale, Markusen, Pearson & Smith, Natural Resources Taxation, 29 AM.
U.L. REv. 281, 281 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Natural Resources Taxation].
112. See id at 283.
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cases. This is not particularly surprising. The concept itself is vague; it
is difficult to apply in a principled fashion; and it is inherently anti-
assimilationist in nature - characteristics apparently disturbing to
some members of the Court.'1 3 The peculiar shortcomings of the terri-
torialist component have been discussed.' 14 The point has beenmade
that territorialism is neither policy-reflective nor easy to apply. The "in-
fringement" strand remains similarly weak: it seems capable of accom-
modating matters of policy, but it may be more difficult to apply than
territorialism. Almost everything a state does will affect an Indian res-
ervation located within its borders. The reservation's economy cannot
be completely independent of the state's. Questions of infringement
are therefore necessarily questions of degree, and predictably difficult
to resolve. Moreover, as Professor Barsh has noted:
The infringement test is internally inconsistent and politically
paradoxical. When it authorizes a state action, is the Court
really saying it will have no adverse impact upon the tribe?
Why, then, did the tribe complain in the first place? Barring
some extraordinary ignorance on the part of the adversaries,
the theory of the remedy is completely at war with the very
existence of a dispute. A court cannot please everyone by
means of the cute fiction that it will uphold that party whose
claim is not adverse to the other's."
5
113. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 176-90 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even Justice Black, author of the WiY-
inams opinion and inventor of the infringement standard, saw assimilation as the ultimate
goal of federal policy. In Williams, the Justice wrote:
Congress has followed a policy calculated eventually to make all Indians full-fledg-
ed participants in American society. This policy contemplates criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians by any State ready to assume the burdens that go with it
as soon as the educational and economic status of the Indians permits the change
without disadvantage to them.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
One commentator has suggested that the vagueness of the concept of sovereignty is
responsible for the Court's retreat from the standard. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of
the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
115. Barsh, supra note 22, at 6. Professor Barsh has been openly critical of the Williams
decision itself:
Black's citations were inaccurate, inapplicable, or misconstrued. His oft-quoted
rule that, "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them," was his own invention, albeit more or less consis-
tent with the results of prior federal decisions. It had never before appeared as the
rule of a case. In fact, Black himself had stated the opposite rule in dictum twelve
years earlier in New York ex rel Ray v. Martim
Id (footnotes omitted).
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The Supreme Court's antipathy toward tribal sovereignty was for-
malized in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission. 116 The opinion is
not remarkable for its holding but rather for its strange and enigmatic
rationale and the new characterization it gave, in dictum, to tribal sov-
ereignty. The Court held that Arizona could not tax the reservation
income of Navajo Indians who lived on the Navajo reservation, a result
perfectly consonant with the territorial conception of tribal sovereignty
that governs cases involving only reservation Indians." 7 The Court,
however, appeared to disclaim reliance on tribal sovereignty. The
Court stated, "[t]he modem cases . . tend to avoid reliance on pla-
tonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applica-
ble treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power."'" 8 The
Court undertook an analysis of the Navajo treaty and a few federal
statutes and concluded that by imposing its income tax on reservation
Indians, Arizona had "interfered with matters which the relevant treaty
and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government
and the Indians themselves."' 9
The Court's language and its emphasis on treaty and statutory
construction have led many to conclude that the ratio decidendi of Mc-
Clanahai was federal preemption. 20 It was not. The touchstone for
federal preemption of state law under the supremacy clause is federal
legislation which either conflicts directly with the state law in question
or which constitutes such a pervasive and comprehensive statutory
scheme that it occupies the entire field and leaves no room for state law
on the subject.' 2' The Court's discussion of the Navajo treaty and the
federal statutes in McClanahan did not focus on either of these ele-
ments. The Court acknowledged that "[t]he treaty nowhere explicitly
states that the Navajos were to be . . .exempt from state taxes."'
' 22
Moreover, the thrust of the Court's discussion of the relevant federal
statutes was not directed toward ascertaining congressional intent to
oust state taxing power, but rather toward demonstrating that Congress
has never legislated a divestment of tribal immunity from state taxa-
tion. Implicit is the assumption that state tax immunity is an aspect of
aboriginal sovereignty which the tribe has retained. For example, the
116. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 9-19.
118. 411 U.S. at 172.
119. Id at 165.
120. See, e.g., Mettler, A Unifled Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
89, 117 (1978).
121. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-404 (1978).
122. 411 U.S. at 174.
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Court stated that "Congress' intent to maintain the tax-exempt status of
reservation Indians is especially clear in light of the Buck Act ...
which provides comprehensive federal guidance for state taxation of
those living within federal areas."'" Of a similar nature were the
Court's discussions of the Arizona Enabling Act 24 and Public Law
280.125 Nowhere in its opinion did the Court identify any federal legis-
lation of a preemptive character.
Justice Rehnquist's discussion of McClanahan in his Confederated
Tribes concurrence is instructive. The Justice stated:
The question presented in [McClanahan] was whether the
State of Arizona had jurisdiction to impose a tax on a reserva-
tion Indiin's income derived solely from reservation sources.
The Court first reviewed the "tradition of sovereignty" rele-
vant to this "narrow question". . .. Historically this Court
had found Indians to be exempt from taxes on Indian owner-
ship and activity confined to the reservation and not involving
non-Indians. .... With this tradition placing reservation-
ownership beyond the jurisdiction of the States, the Court un-
dertook a review of the relevant treaties and statutes to deter-
mine whether this tradition of immunity had been altered by
Congress. Although no legislation directly provided that In-
dians were to be immune from state taxation under these cir-
cumstances, the enactments reviewed were certainly
suggestive of that interpretation. . . The Court therefore de-
clined to infer a congressional departurefrom theprior tradition
of Indian immunity absent an express provision otherwise.
Thus, as this Court's opinion in Bryan v. Itasca County...
later characterized it, McClanahan established a rule against
finding that 'ambiguous statutes abolish by implication Indian
tax immunities. ",'
26
Thus, the Court's disclaimer notwithstanding, McClanahan is at
bottom a sovereignty case. The holding of the case signaled a signifi-
cant reaffirmation of the territorialist philosophy of Worcester.
127
123. Id at 176 (emphasis added).
124. 36 Stat. 569 (1910).
125. 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1322-1324 (1976)).
126. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 178-79 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see Barsh &
Henderson, Yhe Betrayal- Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the
Snark, 63 Mwn. L. REv. 609, 614 (1979).
127. See Werhan, supra note 5, at 17 ("Although the Court had eschewed the high-
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What is most striking about McClanahan, however, is the extent to
which the Court was willing to obfuscate the issue in order to avoid
appearing to rely on tribal sovereignty. The consequence has been a
confusion which the Court has only recently set straight.
One dictum has proven particularly troublesome. In the course of
its preliminary discussion of federal preemption, the McClanahan
Court stated: "[tihe Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not
because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties
and federal statutes must be read."' 28 Now, preemption is a creature of
congressional intent. What the Court meant in McClanahan was that
when congressional intent was unclear, the presence or absence of a
recognized tradition of Indian sovereignty over the particular subject-
matter involved might shed some light on whether Congress intended
to preempt state law. 129 The Court did nothing more than make explicit
the conceptual tie between the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and the
doctrine of federal preemption.
Some courts and commentators, however, have read McClanahan
differently. 130 It has been suggested that Indian sovereignty no longer
provides an independent basis for decision-that sovereignty now ex-
ists only as an aspect of federal preemption. 13 1 In White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 132 the Supreme Court was careful to dispel
this notion. The Court, per Justice Marshall, stated:
[Clongressional authority and the "semi-independent posi-
tion" of Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but
related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority
sounding tones of sovereignty and had embraced, in its judgment, the more practical appli-
cation of preemption analysis, the results obtained in.. .McClanahan. . .are precisely the
same as that which would follow from Worcester.'" (footnote omitted). Cf. United States v.
New Mexico, 590 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1978) ("[E]ven though the Navajos who were
involved in the McClanahan case did not have an express guarantee of freedom or exemp-
tion from state taxes in [their] treaty, the concept of sovereignty nevertheless precludes ef-
forts by the state to tax Indians on the reservation.").
128. 411 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added).
129. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 177-78 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. See Mettler, supra note 120, at 117 (footnote omitted):
The [McClanahan] decision. . . came close to expressly extinguishing the infringe-
ment of tribal sovereignty as an independent bar to state jurisdiction by saying that
the sovereignty doctrine "is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive reso-
lution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which
the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."
131. See id at 119-20.
132. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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over tribal reservations and members. First, the exercise of
such authority may be preempted by federal law. . . .Sec-
ond, it may unlawfully infringe "on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them...."
The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone,
can be a sufficient basisfor holding state law inapplicable to ac-
tivity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members. 133
Yet, even though tribal sovereignty retains separate vitality, it re-
mains disfavored as a ground for decision in tax cases. As McClanahan
indicated, thepreferred rationale is federal preemption. White Mountain
Apache is illustrative. In White Mountain Apache the Supreme Court
held that Arizona's motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes were pre-
empted by federal law insofar as the state sought to apply them to a
logging company operating on an Indian reservation. The petitioner
tribe challenged the taxes on both federal preemption and tribal sover-
eignty grounds.1 34 After reaffirming the vitality of the tribal sover-
eignty limitation on state taxation, the Court ignored it; only the tribe's
preemption claim was considered.
The general approach, as reflected in White Mountain Apache and
subsequent cases, seems to be this: The court first checks to see
whether the state tax has been preempted by federal law, taking care to
construe federal enactments "generously in order to comport with...
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encour-
aging tribal independence"' 35 (the "backdrop" concept). If the state
tax has been preempted, then the inquiry is concluded. Only if the
court determines that the tax has not been preempted does it then check
to see whether the tax unlawfully infringes upon tribal sovereignty.
36
It should be fairly obvious that under this approach state taxes will
seldom be invalidated on tribal sovereignty grounds. Federal legisla-
tion in the field of Indian affairs is pervasive. A large number of con-
gressional enactments demonstrate the "firm federal policy of-
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development," ' 7 con-
cepts particularly relevant to questions of Indian tax immunity. For
133. Id at 142-43 (emphasis added).
134. Id at 138.
135. Id at 144.
136. See, e.g., Mescalero. Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 728 (10th Cir.
1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981). But cf Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d
1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (invalidating a state tax on both federal preemption and tribal sover-
eignty grounds).
137. 448 U.S. at 143.
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example, the purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act138 is to "reha-
bilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop
the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism."'
1 39
In addition, the Indian Financing Act of 1974140 states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress. . .to help
develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and
human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise re-
sponsibility for the utilization and management of their own
resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from
their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by
non-Indians in neighboring communities.
1 41
Indeed, "[t]he extent of. . .residual Indian sovereignty in the to-
tal absence of federal treaty obligations or legislation is. . .generally
of little more than theoretical importance. . . since in almost all cases
federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and state
jurisdiction."' 142 Thus, many tax questions in which tribal sovereignty
is implicated can be resolved, with a little judicial legerdemain, on pre-
emption grounds. The partial incorporation of sovereignty into pre-
emption analysis as a backdrop "against which vague or ambiguous
federal enactments must always be measured"143 facilitates the process.
Tribal sovereignty may still be alive, but for the moment it does not
appear likely to figure prominently in the tax cases.
VII. THE EMERGENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST BALANCING
The Supreme Court's de-emphasis of tribal sovereignty has been
defended on the ground that the Court's approach "maximizes the abil-
ity of States and tribes to determine the scope of their respective au-
thority without resort to adjudication, and maximizes judicial
deference to the legislative forum."'144 In point of fact, it does neither.
138. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version in numerous
sections of 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976)).
139. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934); see Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
140. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1974).
141. Id § 1451; see Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n, 452, 455-458 (1976); Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal SoY-
ereignty: An Anaiysir of Recent Federal Indian Policy, 56 TEx. L. Rav. 1195 (1978).
142. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1973); see Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 177-78 & n.2 (1980) (Rehnquist, ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
143. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
144. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 181 (1980) (Rehnquist, 3., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Court has developed a technique for resolving claims of tribal sov-
ereignty and federal preemption that both decreases predictability and
maximizes judicial activism. The trend is for the Court to rely no
longer solely upon congressional intent to determine the preemptive
effect of federal legislation. And the Williams "infringement" test is ap-
parently no longer the sole standard for resolving claims of tribal sover-
eign immunity from state taxation. Instead, once a colorable claim of
tribal sovereignty or federal preemption is advanced, the Court has
taken to balancing the respective governmental interests involved.
For example, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 145 the
Supreme Court undertook a careful comparison of state and tribal in-
terests en route to holding that the state could lawfully impose its ciga-
rette taxes on sales by tribal retailers to non-Indians. The Court stated:
The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions
of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an
accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the
Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State,
on the other. . . .While the Tribes do have an interest in
raising revenues for essential governmental programs, that in-
terest is strongest when the revenues are derived from value
generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes
and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The
State also has a legitimate governmental interest in raising
revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax is
directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the
recipient of state services. As we have already noted, Wash-
ington's taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the Tribes
from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers who do
not receive significant tribal services and who would other-
wise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations.
1 46
The Court held that "the State's interest in taxing these purchasers out-
weighs any tribal interest that may exist in preventing the State from
imposing its taxes."147
In Confederated Tribes, the Court used interest balancing to re-
solve a sovereignty claim. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brack-
er, 141 the Court relied upon interest balancing to sustain a claim of
exemption from state taxation on federal preemption grounds. The
145. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
146. Id at 156-57.
147. Id at 161.
148. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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Court first demonstrated that the territorialist principle which bars state
taxation of reservation Indians on a reservation could be rationalized
in terms of federal/state interest balancing. The Court stated: "When
on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is
generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be
minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government
is at its strongest."' 49 The Court then addressed the issue of non-In-
dian involvement, noting:
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts
authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity
on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the lan-
guage of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of
both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on
mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sover-
eignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the na-
ture of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.' 50
The Court then held that Arizona could not impose its motor vehi-
cle license and use fuel taxes on a non-Indian logging company work-
ing for the Navajo tribe on the Navajo reservation. The Court noted
that Arizona performed no "governmental functions. . . for those on
whom the taxes [fell].'' Nor did the taxes serve "a legitimate regula-
tory interest."' 2 The only state interest at stake was a desire to raise
revenues. 53 In contrast, a number of federal policies were threatened
by the state tax. 154 The balance, therefore, tipped in favor of preemp-
tion. The Court said, "[w]e do not believe that respondents' genera-
lized interest in raising revenue is in this context sufficient to permit its
proposed intrusion into the federal regulatory scheme with respect to
the harvesting and sale of tribal timber."'1-
5
In Crow Tribe ofIndians v. Montana, 156 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals used the Confederated Tribes interest balancing approach to
149. Id at 144.
150. Id at 144-45.
151. Id at 150.
152. Id
153. Id
154. See id at 148-50.
155. Id at-150.
156. 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
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resolve a tribal sovereignty claim. Beneath the Crow reservation in
Montana are vast deposits of coal. In an effort to exploit this resource,
the Crow Tribe entered into mining leases with and granted prospect-
ing permits to several non-Indian companies.15 7 However, Montana
imposed a thirty percent severance tax on coal produced in the state
and a gross proceeds tax on the sale of coal produced in the state.158
The state thus appropriated most of the coal's value to itself; between
1975 and 1981, the state's taxes netted it $30 million, while the tribe's
royalties amounted to only $8 million. 15 9 Understandably, the tribe
brought suit, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against imposi-
tion of the taxes on the production of the non-Indian mineral leases.
The tribe alleged that Montana's taxes impermissibly infringed upon
the tribe's ability to govern itself in two ways: (1) by impairing the
tribe's ability to levy its own severance tax, and (2) by reducing the
royalties the lessees could afford to pay. The tribe contended that the
resultant reduction in tribal income "'severely impaired the ability of
the sovereign Crow Tribe to serve its people through its various pro-
grams and governmental services, including but not limited to its vi-
tally important land repurchase program, its tribal cultural and
historical program, its tribal educational program and its reservation
maintenance services.' ,160
The district court dismissed the tribe's complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.16 The Ninth Circuit
reversed. The appellate court first distinguished Confederated Tribes,
noting that this was "not a case where the tribe is simply marketing a
tax exemption, as where tribes seek to sell tax-free cigarettes to non-
Indians."' 162 Rather, the subject of the tax was "a component of the
reservation land itself."' 163 The court noted that, beyond recoupment of
157. Id at 1107.
158. ld; see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 641 (1981) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting), noting that "the imposition of [Montana's] severance tax has generated
enormous revenues for the State" and decrying Montana's policy of "OPEC-like revenue
maximization." Ad at 643 (citing R. NEHRING & B. ZYCHER, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND
GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT
148 (1976)).
159. 650 F.2d at 1107; see Natural Resources Taxation, supra note 111, at 283.
160. 650 F.2d at 1116.
161. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154, 167 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd, 650
F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. 650 F.2d at 1117.
163. Id. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge of Montana's severance tax by
Montana coal producers and out-of-state utility customers. The Court held that the tax
violated neither the commerce clause nor the supremacy clause. On a petition for rehearing
1982]
LOYOL OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
any governmental costs associated with the mining operations, Mon-
tana's interest in the coal was slight. In contrast, the tribe's interest in
the revenue generated by its own land was strong. The court held that
Montana's taxes would fail under the tribal sovereignty doctrine if the
tribe could show at trial that "the taxes substantially affect its ability to
offer governmental services or its ability to regulate the development of
tribal resources, and that the balance of state and tribal interests ren-
ders the state's assertion of taxing authority unreasonable."'
The implications of this interest balancing approach for tribal sov-
ereignty are unclear. It may make tribal sovereignty a more attractive
basis for decision than it has been in the past. The flexibility of the
approach is apparent, and it seems to provide a principled means of
resolving delicate questions of infringement. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the concept of judicial interest balancing is inconsistent with a
policy of judicial deference to the legislative branch - the policy that
relegated tribal sovereignty to a position of diminished importance
among the models for limiting state taxation of Indians in the first
place. The availability of an interest balancing approach may en-
courage the courts to face squarely the many difficult and challenging
questions which remain in the area of tribal sovereign immunity from




The doctrine of tribal sovereignty reflects most vividly the kaleido-
scopic nature of federal Indian policy. Rigidly territorial at its incep-
tion, the doctrine has since undergone a startling metamorphosis.
Assertions of tribal sovereignty in the face of state taxation are now
subject to a flexible, interest balancing analysis. Territorialism remains
the touchstone only for cases in which Indians alone are involved.
With this shift in focus has come a decrease in popularity. Federal
in Crow Tribe, the Ninth Circuit rejected the state's contention that Commonwealth Edison
mandated affirmance, correctly noting that the latter involved "[clompletely different con-
siderations." Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 665 F.2d 1390, 1391 (9th Cir. 1982). In
Commonwealth Edison, the question was the constitutionality of the tax; in Crow Tribe, the
question was the nature of the limitation on state power to tak Indian tribes, Indian-related
activities, and Indian trust property.
164. 650 F.2d at 1117. Alternatively, the court held that the tribe's complaint alleged a
colorable claim of federal preemption. Id at 1111-15.
165. Compare Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 171-72 n.7 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) with id at 186 n. II (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); see McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Soyerelgnty:
Accommodating Triba, State, and FederalInterests, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 357 (1978).
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preemption has recently become the preferred basis for decision in the
Indian tax cases. Only when the question cannot be resolved on pre-
emption grounds will the Supreme Court consider assertions of tribal
sovereignty. Consequently, many questions remain unanswered. For
example, it is well established that the mere economic burden imposed
upon a tribe by state taxation of non-Indians will not constitute an un-
lawful infringement on tribal sovereignty, even when the tribe itself is
engaged in the taxed activity; but the law is unclear as to just what will
violate the sovereignty standard when non-Indians are involved.
Supreme Court dicta indicate that the Court may seek to preserve tribal
tax revenues against erosion by state taxation through a system of sov-
ereignty-mandated tax credits. And prohibitory or regulatory state tax-
ation may be held to run afoul of important tribal development
policies. But these issues have yet to be properly litigated.
Tribal sovereignty functions as an adjunct to the doctrine of fed-
eral preemption, as well as providing an independent ground for deci-
sion itself. Its independent efficacy has been questioned of late, but its
theoretical framework remains intact, and the Supreme Court's recent
emphasis on governmental interest balancing may breathe new life into
the doctrine. Whether this will result in an enhancement or in a dilu-
tion of tribal sovereignty remains to be seen.
166
166. A recent case indicates that the Supreme Court may well be prepared to dilute tribal
sovereignty substantially. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); cf. Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894, 913 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
the limited nature of tribal authority over nonmembers).
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